Exposed Metadata

Source-backed reference

A public PDF and three photographs tell two stories: the one visible on the page, and the private details left inside the files. The vulnerability is publishing both without a metadata review.

OSINTPassive reconnaissancePDF Info dictionaryJPEG EXIFGPS interpretationInformation exposure
  1. 1. Authoring inputsPDF + source JPEGsOrdinary marketing content and stock photographs.
  2. 2. Embedded detailsComments / EXIF / GPSThe build adds a flag, usernames, coordinates, and internal notes.
  3. 3. Public release/downloads/Nginx serves the complete files with no sanitization or authentication.
  4. 4. Local inspectionRead metadata, correlateA recipient can discover information not shown in the normal preview.
The trust boundary is publication. No code execution, login bypass, or server-side injection is needed to explain this disclosure.

The scenario

Aegis Defense Systems is a fictional defense contractor in this training lab. Its website advertises a capabilities brief, a facility exterior photograph, a drone survey, and an operations-center photograph as public resources.

The PDF carries a flag in a custom metadata field. The photographs carry identities, equipment details, timestamps, GPS coordinates, and freeform operational notes. The operations-center comment even labels a Wi-Fi value and names an internal VPN endpoint and badge number.

In a real assessment, the point is not simply finding a flag. It is demonstrating exactly which unintended details crossed the public-release boundary, where they came from, and what a publisher must change to prevent recurrence.

What was reviewed—and what was not run

The local Dockerfile, Compose file, Nginx configuration, website source, metadata configuration, Python generators, three Markdown guides, and already-extracted six-page PDF text were read. No supplied file or script was executed. No Docker build, container, server, metadata-extraction command, browser preview, or live-target request was run. Values below are source-defined, not a captured download transcript.

What a complete solve means

  • Identify all four public download paths and their file types.
  • Explain the difference between visible content and embedded metadata.
  • Locate the PDF's custom Comments field and the source-defined flag.
  • Interpret the JPEG fields, including GPS hemisphere references and complete UserComment values.
  • Compile an evidence-backed finding without treating editable metadata as proof of a real location, person, or working credential.
  • Recommend a file-type-aware release process, not just hiding a download link.

The central idea

Permission to view a document is not necessarily permission to receive every hidden field inside it.

The important correction

The current Dockerfile configures one flag in the PDF. Older image-flag claims do not match its drone comment.

Reveal the source-defined default flag

The Dockerfile fallback and Compose build argument agree on this value. A different build argument can change it; no generated challenge PDF was inspected here.

PDF Comments · default configuration
FLAG{classified_document_metadata_exposed}

The supplied six-page write-up also lists this as its single flag. The supposed drone flag mentioned in other documentation is not injected by the current Dockerfile.

How the leak works

Checked against build source

The server serves bytes. It does not know which fields are harmless marketing metadata and which should have stayed internal. That decision has to happen before publication.

1. Metadata is separate from the normal preview

A PDF can store document properties in its Info dictionary and in an XMP metadata stream. Author, creation tool, dates, and custom keys may be available to a parser even if they never appear on a rendered page. A comment in the Info dictionary is not the same thing as a visible PDF annotation.

A JPEG is not just compressed pixels. Its marker segments can hold EXIF, XMP, IPTC, comments, thumbnails, and other data. EXIF commonly uses TIFF-style directories for camera and exposure fields, a GPS directory for coordinates, and fields such as UserComment for notes. The current lab deliberately writes these fields with ExifTool.

A preview that looks innocuous therefore says little about the complete file. A screenshot is a different artifact and will not preserve the original PDF properties or JPEG metadata in the same way.

2. The current build prepares the artifacts

The builder uses python:3.12-slim, installs ExifTool and fpdf2==2.8.*, and runs only generate_pdf.py. It copies three existing stock JPEGs to their public filenames, then writes the lab metadata into those copies.

Dockerfile · selected build declarations, not executed
FROM python:3.12-slim AS builder
ARG FLAG
ENV FLAG=${FLAG:-FLAG{classified_document_metadata_exposed}}

COPY scripts/generate_pdf.py /build/generate_pdf.py
COPY scripts/exiftool_custom.config /build/exiftool_custom.config
COPY source_images/ /build/source_images/

RUN python /build/generate_pdf.py
RUN cp /build/source_images/facility_exterior.jpg /output/Aegis_Facility_Exterior.jpg && \
    cp /build/source_images/aerial_survey.jpg /output/Site_Survey_Drone_Capture.jpg && \
    cp /build/source_images/ops_center.jpg /output/Operations_Center_Interior.jpg

scripts/generate_images.py remains in the repository, but the Dockerfile neither copies it nor runs it. Its Pillow-generated images, dimensions, and overlays are not evidence about the current public JPEGs.

3. A custom PDF field carries the flag

The PDF generator sets familiar properties such as Author and Creator. The Dockerfile's subsequent ExifTool step writes the flag through -Comments="${FLAG_VALUE}", plus dates, producer, title, subject, and keywords.

scripts/exiftool_custom.config · complete inert snapshot
%Image::ExifTool::UserDefined = (
    'Image::ExifTool::PDF::Info' => {
        Comments => {
            Writable => 'string',
            Groups => { 2 => 'Document' },
        },
    },
);

1;

This Perl configuration defines a writable user tag in the PDF Info table. It is configuration code, not a PDF payload. The guide displays it without loading it. ExifTool's PDF documentation notes that user-defined Info keys are also extracted; broad read-only inspection is a better first step than assuming every tool will label the field exactly Comment.

4. JPEG metadata mixes identity, place, and operations

The exterior image gets a photographer handle, camera model, maintenance note, and coordinates. The drone image gets a pilot handle, device serial, survey date, authorization identifier, and coordinates. The operations-center image gets a phone model, exercise name, coordinates, and an internal-use comment with credential-like values.

These fields reinforce each other as leads: a filename gives context, an artist field gives an identity string, and a comment adds a schedule or endpoint. They are still editable strings. This particular lab proves that fact directly: its build writes fictional camera identities and military-area coordinates onto stock photographs.

5. Nginx exposes the complete files

nginx.conf · public-file serving excerpt
root /usr/share/nginx/html;
index index.html;

location / {
    try_files $uri $uri/ =404;
}

location /downloads/ {
    autoindex on;
    types {
        application/pdf pdf;
        image/jpeg jpg jpeg;
        image/png png;
    }
}

The runtime image is nginx:1.27-alpine. It receives the website and the four prepared artifacts under /usr/share/nginx/html/downloads/. The supplied virtual host has no authentication, proxying, or TLS configuration. Nginx returns the files rather than transforming or scrubbing them.

autoindex on enables a directory listing when a directory request has no matching index file. That makes enumeration easier, but it is not required for this solve: downloads.html already names all four assets.

A download button is not a security control

The HTML download attribute suggests how a browser handles a link. It does not remove metadata, encrypt the file, or add access control. Likewise, server_tokens off, cache headers, and a classification banner do not sanitize the response body.

6. The weakness is information exposure

A useful root-cause mapping is CWE-538: sensitive information inserted into an externally accessible file. Directory listing is separately described by CWE-548. The broader consequence is loss of confidentiality, not proof of remote code execution or a compromised VPN.

The read-only solve ends at extracting and reporting the exposure. Attempting to use the displayed Wi-Fi value, contact an internal endpoint, or investigate real military sites is neither necessary nor authorized by this training scenario.

Metadata & evidence

Source-defined values

Record the file, field, and exact value before interpreting it. A location-shaped number or a credential-shaped string is a finding to assess—not permission to act on it.

These values come from MetaData/Dockerfile. They are intended metadata assignments, not independently extracted output. Any additional metadata inherited from the stock JPEGs remains unreviewed.

The four public artifacts

Filename under /downloads/TypePrimary disclosure
Aegis_Defense_2024_Capabilities_Brief.pdfPDFAuthor, authoring software, dates, custom flag-bearing Comments.
Aegis_Facility_Exterior.jpgJPEGPhotographer handle, camera, location, maintenance contact.
Site_Survey_Drone_Capture.jpgJPEGPilot handle, drone serial, location, next survey, flight authorization.
Operations_Center_Interior.jpgJPEGStaff handle, phone, location, exercise, credential-like and infrastructure notes.

PDF: properties, not page content

FieldConfigured valueInterpretation
AuthormjohnsonAuthor/username-like string; a real account is not established.
CreatorMicrosoft Word 2019Claimed authoring tool; explicitly assigned despite an fpdf2 generator.
ProducerMicrosoft(R) Word 2019Claimed PDF-producing software, also assigned by the lab.
TitleAegis Defense Systems - 2024 Capabilities BriefDocument label.
SubjectDefense Capabilities Overview - UNCLASSIFIEDDescriptive string, not access enforcement.
CreateDate2024:04:12 08:45:22-04:00Explicit timezone; source-defined, not a proven workflow event.
ModifyDate2024:07:18 16:33:09-04:00Later claimed edit time; does not prove who edited what.
CommentsConfigured FLAG valueCustom PDF Info field; reveal the default on the Overview page.

Facility exterior: identity and maintenance

Artist = sgt.ramirez, Make = Canon, Model = Canon EOS R5, and LensModel = RF 24-105mm F4 L IS USM. The assigned software is Adobe Photoshop Lightroom Classic 13.2.

The source labels the image an East Wing annual compliance inspection. Its DateTimeOriginal is 2024:08:15 14:32:08; its ModifyDate is 2024:08:20 09:14:55. No timezone is assigned to those JPEG timestamps.

Read the complete facility UserComment
Dockerfile · line 79
Building 7 main entrance. Badge reader replacement scheduled Q4-2024. Contact: facilities@aegis-internal.mil

The address is a fictional lab string. A maintenance note can expose both a contact convention and the timing of a facility change.

Drone survey: asset and schedule

Artist = kthompson, Make = DJI, Model = FC3582, Software = DJI GO 4 v4.3.37, and SerialNumber = 4LKDJ23AA00192. The assigned original timestamp is 2024:09:22 09:15:43.

Read the complete drone UserComment
Dockerfile · line 104 · no flag in this assignment
Sensor array coordinates confirmed. Next survey scheduled: 2024-10-15. Drone Serial Number: 4LKDJ23AA00192. Pilot: K. Thompson. Flight authorization: FA-2024-0922-B7.

The serial appears in both a dedicated tag and this note. A matching string is useful correlation, but neither entry proves ownership or authentic flight history.

Operations center: the highest-impact note

Artist = r.chen, Make = Apple, Model = iPhone 14 Pro, and Software = 17.2. The description is Ops Center Level 3 - Active monitoring during Exercise IRON SHIELD.

The assigned original timestamp is 2024:11:03 22:47:19; the modification time is 2024:11:04 08:02:33. Those metadata timestamps have no assigned timezone. The separate backup-window note explicitly uses UTC.

Reveal the fictional operations-center credential and infrastructure note

Training data only. None of these values was tested, resolved, or used.

Dockerfile · line 133 · complete UserComment
Internal use only. WiFi: AegisOps_Secure2024! / VPN endpoint: vpn.aegis-internal.mil / Badge: AC-7734 / Nightly backup window: 0200-0400 UTC

The guide interprets the Wi-Fi-labelled value as the intended password leak, following the supplied walkthrough. It does not prove an SSID, a valid VPN login, or usable badge access.

GPS: preserve the hemisphere and precision

EXIF stores latitude and longitude magnitudes plus reference directions. North and east are positive; south and west are negative when expressed as signed decimal degrees. A western longitude entered as positive lands on the wrong side of the world.

Degrees / minutes / seconds conversion
magnitude = degrees + minutes / 60 + seconds / 3600
signed_decimal = -magnitude for S or W; +magnitude for N or E

Exterior latitude  = 38 + 52/60 + 19.00/3600 = 38.871944...
Exterior longitude = -(77 + 3/60 + 22.50/3600) = -77.056250
ImageAssigned EXIF coordinatesDerived decimal degreesArea named by lab docs
Exterior38°52′19.00″ N
77°03′22.50″ W
38.871944, -77.056250Arlington / Pentagon area, Virginia.
Drone32°22′59.50″ N
106°28′43.00″ W
32.383194, -106.478611White Sands area, New Mexico.
Operations34°54′19.40″ N
117°53′01.30″ W
34.905389, -117.883694Edwards AFB area, California.

Coordinates are leads, not proof of a classified site

These coordinates were deliberately assigned to stock images. Area names are the supplied documentation's interpretation, not an independent map verification. A map lookup also shares a coordinate query with a third party; it is optional, and none is embedded or automatically requested here.

GPSAltitudeRef is set to Above Sea Level, with values of 25 m, 120.4 m, and 702 m. The drone's 120.4 m is therefore a claimed altitude above sea level, not automatically its height above the ground. Its speed assignment uses GPSSpeed = 8.2 and a km/h reference; the unused image generator's m/s overlay is not authoritative.

Turn fields into a defensible finding

  • Observation: a public artifact contains a specific field and value, supported by its path and read-only extraction record in a future assessment.
  • Context: explain why the value should not be public—credential-like data, internal infrastructure, a schedule, identity strings, or unwanted location disclosure.
  • Inference: clearly label proposed roles or site associations. Do not upgrade an Artist string into proof of an employee's job.
  • Limit: no account, credential, location, or device claim is authenticated merely by appearing in metadata.
  • Fix: remove sensitive values from the actual downloadable bytes and verify the final release copies.

Solve walkthrough

Passive inspection plan

Find what is public, preserve the original artifact, inspect all metadata, then narrow the output. Searching only for a flag misses the more important disclosure.

This is a study plan for a future owned, isolated lab session—not a record of commands run here. Every example is inert reference text. Setup, downloads, extraction, and mapping were not performed.

  1. Establish scope and the release surface

    The supplied Compose file defines agis-web and maps host port 8080 to container port 80. The intended local homepage is http://localhost:8080/, and the resources page is http://localhost:8080/downloads.html. These are reference addresses, not live links in this HTML.

    For this static review, reading the website source is enough to identify all four download paths. No brute-force enumeration, authentication attempt, or external reconnaissance is required.

    Record: the authorized host, resource-page path, four filenames, and intended public audience. Do not treat fictional .mil strings as additional in-scope targets.
  2. Preserve the exact artifacts

    In a future assessment, acquire the original published files rather than screenshots or re-saved previews. Record each source URL, retrieval time, size, and SHA-256. Keep an untouched evidence copy and work on duplicates.

    The local source_images/ files are pre-injection build inputs, not the final downloaded JPEGs. The six-page lab documentation PDF is also not the four-page capabilities brief. Mixing either pair produces a misleading comparison.

    Optional evidence hashing · local artifacts only · not run
    sha256sum Aegis_Defense_2024_Capabilities_Brief.pdf \
      Aegis_Facility_Exterior.jpg \
      Site_Survey_Drone_Capture.jpg \
      Operations_Center_Interior.jpg

    A hash identifies the bytes collected; it does not prove their embedded metadata is true.

  3. Read broadly before filtering

    ExifTool without assignments reads metadata rather than changing it. Begin with duplicates allowed, group names, short tag names, and unknown tags enabled. This helps distinguish same-named values stored in different metadata families.

    Read-only metadata inspection · not run
    exiftool -a -G1 -s -u Aegis_Defense_2024_Capabilities_Brief.pdf
    exiftool -a -G1 -s -u Aegis_Facility_Exterior.jpg
    exiftool -a -G1 -s -u Site_Survey_Drone_Capture.jpg
    exiftool -a -G1 -s -u Operations_Center_Interior.jpg

    -a allows duplicate tags, -G1 shows their specific groups, -s shows tag names instead of friendly descriptions, and -u includes unknown tags. No -Tag=value assignment appears in these examples.

    Record: complete output first. A later keyword filter is navigation, not a substitute for the full evidence record.
  4. Identify the PDF flag and provenance

    Look for the custom PDF Info key Comments and compare its value with the source's configured FLAG. Also record Author, Creator, Producer, title, and dates. A normal page viewer or text extractor may never show the custom field.

    The Dockerfile defines the default and allows build-time substitution. A future artifact can contain a different flag without changing the underlying weakness. The reference answer here is the source-defined default, not proof of extraction from a generated file.

    Reveal the default PDF answer
    One configured flag
    FLAG{classified_document_metadata_exposed}
  5. Read every image's complete comment

    Do not stop at camera model or coordinates. The longest freeform notes contain the maintenance schedule, survey authorization, and credential-like operations data.

    Read-only field selection · not run
    exiftool -a -G1 -s -Artist -Make -Model -Software -SerialNumber \
      -ImageDescription -DateTimeOriginal -CreateDate -ModifyDate \
      -UserComment Aegis_Facility_Exterior.jpg \
      Site_Survey_Drone_Capture.jpg Operations_Center_Interior.jpg

    Some fields will be absent in some files. The current drone comment contains survey details and a serial—not a second flag and not the operations-center credentials.

    Record: each exact note, its source file, metadata group, and field name. Keep inferred personnel roles separate from observed identity strings.
  6. Normalize coordinates without losing meaning

    Preserve the original degrees/minutes/seconds and N/S/E/W references, then derive signed decimal coordinates. ExifTool's -n disables print conversion and can report signed decimal GPS values when hemisphere references are available.

    Read-only GPS inspection · not run
    exiftool -a -G1 -s '-GPS*' Site_Survey_Drone_Capture.jpg
    exiftool -n -GPSLatitude -GPSLongitude -GPSLatitudeRef \
      -GPSLongitudeRef -GPSAltitude -GPSAltitudeRef \
      Site_Survey_Drone_Capture.jpg

    The wildcard is quoted so the shell does not expand it as a filename pattern. Check longitude sign, coordinate order, altitude reference, and precision before interpreting the point. Optional map correlation is a separate step with its own privacy and scope implications.

  7. Report the exposure and stop at the boundary

    Use one evidence row per file/field. Describe the unintended information, likely impact in a real publication workflow, confidence, and remediation. Link the single configured flag to the PDF field; treat other data as supporting findings, not additional answers.

    No Wi-Fi login, VPN connection, badge test, or contact with the named facilities is needed. Finding a credential-shaped value establishes disclosure of that string—not successful access.

    Completion criteria: four artifacts accounted for, PDF flag correctly attributed, all operational comments reviewed, GPS references understood, source discrepancies recorded, and a testable release fix proposed.

If a future inspection disagrees

SymptomFirst thing to inspect
Download paths are missing locallyFinal artifacts are created inside the build; opening the website source alone does not generate website/downloads/.
No flag in the PDF page textThe custom Info dictionary field, not visible marketing content. Also check that this is the capabilities brief, not the lab write-up.
Comment versus Comments confusionRead all fields with -a -G1 -s -u. Friendly descriptions, custom tag names, and tool versions can differ.
No second flag in the droneExpected for the current Dockerfile. Older Markdown claims do not match its injection value.
JPEGs lack the documented lab fieldsPre-injection source image versus final published artifact; a re-save or transformation may also strip metadata.
Coordinates appear on the wrong continentW/S sign, latitude/longitude order, and DMS-to-decimal conversion.
Timestamps disagreeEmbedded metadata versus local file modification time; assigned timezone versus unzoned EXIF values.
Metadata claims Word or iPhone, but inputs differThese identities are deliberately assigned. Metadata is not an authenticated provenance record.

Things to learn

Takeaways & defenses

Review the bytes you publish, not just the page they render. A good fix removes the unintended information and proves it cannot survive in a second metadata family or an older PDF revision.

Separate visibility from availability

“Not shown in the viewer” is not the same as “not in the file.” PDFs and JPEGs can carry useful information outside the rendered page or pixels. Apply public-release review to the complete artifact, including embedded images, thumbnails, attachments, and metadata.

Separate observation from inference

A username-like field does not prove an account exists. A camera model does not prove that camera took the picture. GPS does not authenticate a location, and timestamps do not certify a sequence of events. The lab's stock-image injection is a concrete demonstration of this limitation.

Separate discovery from access control

Disabling a directory listing reduces enumeration but leaves known download URLs accessible. Changing filenames, hiding links, setting no-store, and adding a classification banner do not remove the sensitive bytes. Public documents should be safe to distribute; non-public documents need real authorization.

Design a release pipeline, not a cleanup ritual

  1. Keep a protected original. Store source material outside the public web root; never sanitize the only evidence copy.
  2. Create a publication derivative. Use a file-type-aware toolchain and an explicit allowlist of approved metadata.
  3. Inspect all relevant containers. Review PDF Info/XMP and embedded content, or JPEG EXIF/XMP/IPTC/comments and previews—not just GPS.
  4. Verify the derivative. Compare appearance and required functionality, then check that forbidden fields and strings are absent.
  5. Publish only the verified copy. Recheck the exact CDN/download response, not just the local intermediate file.
  6. Respond to prior exposure. Remove old public copies and backups, invalidate caches where possible, and rotate real exposed credentials. Replacing the file cannot recall copies already downloaded.

PDF deletion is not secure erasure when it is an incremental edit

The supplied walkthrough suggests exiftool -all= document.pdf as a universal fix. ExifTool's official documentation warns that its PDF metadata edits are incremental and reversible: old information can remain in the bytes. A blank current property panel is therefore insufficient evidence of sanitization.

Use a vetted full PDF rewrite or clean regeneration and verify the resulting file for residual metadata and sensitive content. ExifTool documents a subsequent qpdf rewrite as a way to remove old revision information; that still does not automatically redact visible text, attachments, embedded-image data, or every other disclosure surface.

Images need their own policy

Removing GPS alone leaves artist names, serials, software versions, and notes. Broad removal can also affect color-management information or other legitimate properties, so choose an explicit publication policy and verify image appearance. Do not copy all metadata back from the original after stripping it.

ExifTool normally preserves an _original backup when writing files. Such a backup must never be published beside the cleaned image, especially where directory listing is enabled. This review did not perform any metadata modification.

Defense and the check that proves it

ControlUseful verificationWhat it does not do
Metadata allowlist on release copiesIndependent read-only review finds no forbidden GPS, identity, serial, comment, or credential-like fields across metadata families.Redact visible content automatically.
Full PDF rewrite or clean regenerationInspect the final PDF's current metadata, embedded objects, and residual sensitive data—not only the viewer properties.Guarantee all sensitive content was identified beforehand.
Directory listing disabledA directory request no longer reveals the file inventory; known public URLs still serve only approved derivatives.Protect a file at a known URL.
Authorization for restricted artifactsAn unauthenticated request cannot obtain the restricted bytes, including direct URLs.Make an intentionally public file safe by itself.
No raw inputs or backups in the web rootPublished inventory excludes originals, _original backups, temporary files, source configs, and private build logs.Recall previously downloaded copies.
Rotate real exposed secretsThe old secret is revoked through the authorized owner's process; scope and affected systems are documented.Erase already leaked identities, locations, or schedules.

A small regression test plan

For an authorized remediation exercise, seed test artifacts with distinctive fictional values in PDF Info/XMP and image EXIF/XMP/comments, pass them through the release pipeline, and inspect the final bytes. Include a PDF with earlier revisions and an image with duplicate metadata families.

A successful test must demonstrate that all forbidden values are absent, required visible content still works, and only the cleaned derivative can be downloaded. A substring search alone is not exhaustive: values may be encoded, compressed, or embedded in other objects. No such test was run here.

Self-check

  • Can I explain why viewing an image is not the same as inspecting its file?
  • Can I distinguish PDF Comments metadata from a visible annotation?
  • Can I explain why the current drone comment is not a second-flag source?
  • Can I convert DMS coordinates while preserving west/south signs?
  • Can I distinguish altitude above sea level from height above ground?
  • Can I explain why “Creator: Word” is not proof that Word produced the file?
  • Can I explain why disabling autoindex does not fix a public file's metadata?
  • Can I explain why ExifTool alone is not secure PDF metadata erasure?
  • Can I define the exact evidence that would prove a cleaned release is safe?

Useful follow-up topics

PDF incremental updates and XMP; JPEG marker segments and TIFF/EXIF directories; evidence preservation; signed GPS coordinates; metadata allowlists and DLP; public-artifact inventories; and the difference between confidentiality controls and cosmetic publishing changes.

Files & source notes

Provenance & corrections

The current source is the best description of what a future build intends to publish. The documentation remains useful—but several older claims need to travel with their corrections.

Reviewed file inventory

Local pathRoleReview boundary
MetaData/DockerfilePDF generation, stock-image copies, metadata assignments, runtime packaging.Read in full; authoritative source for configured values. Not built.
MetaData/docker-compose.ymlagis-web, default FLAG build argument, 8080:80, restart policy.Read in full. No Compose command run.
MetaData/nginx.confStatic web root, MIME types, downloads autoindex, cache header.Read in full. No server launched or endpoint tested.
MetaData/scripts/generate_pdf.pyfpdf2 capabilities brief: properties, four explicit page additions, marketing content.Read in full; not executed. Final PDF generation/page count not verified.
MetaData/scripts/generate_images.pyOlder Pillow image-generation route.Read in full; not executed and not referenced by the current Dockerfile.
MetaData/scripts/exiftool_custom.configWritable custom PDF Info Comments tag.Read as text; not loaded by ExifTool or a Perl interpreter.
MetaData/website/index.html
MetaData/website/downloads.html
MetaData/website/css/style.css
Public-site presentation and four resource links.Source read; site not rendered or served.
MetaData/source_images/facility_exterior.jpg
MetaData/source_images/aerial_survey.jpg
MetaData/source_images/ops_center.jpg
Current stock-image build inputs.Paths inventoried and matched to Dockerfile copy instructions. Pixels and native metadata not inspected or embedded.
MetaData/README.md
MetaData/EX1PLOITATION_GUIDE.md
MetaData/LA1B_ARCHITECTURE.md
Scenario, intended solve, architecture, and defense recommendations.Read in full; claims checked against current source.
Arshlaan_s Write-ups/Exposed Metadata - Aegis Defense Systems.pdfSix-page lab documentation with hints and one listed PDF flag.Direct PDF preview unsupported. Its already-extracted text was read; the original PDF is not embedded.
madx.html
its-a-fly.html
Reference-page structure, forest/paper styling, local navigation and utilities.Read as text only. Existing references left unchanged.

Do not confuse the two PDFs

The supplied six-page Exposed Metadata write-up describes the lab. The intended four-page Aegis capabilities brief is a separate artifact created by generate_pdf.py and modified during the Docker build. Finding the default flag in documentation is not equivalent to extracting it from that challenge artifact.

Discrepancy register

TopicOlder or imprecise claimCurrent-source correction
Number of flagsThe exploitation guide mentions a drone flag while its objective and submission table say one flag.The Dockerfile sets the PDF Comments flag only; its drone comment has no flag. A future built artifact was not independently inspected.
Drone comment contentsREADME/PDF validation comments say the drone contains Wi-Fi, VPN, and badge details.Those assignments belong to the operations-center image. The drone carries survey/pilot/serial/authorization notes.
Image preparationREADME, architecture, and PDF describe generate_images.py and programmatic 1024×768 imagery.The current Dockerfile copies source_images/ stock JPEGs. Pillow is not installed there; the generator is not copied or invoked.
Service name and folderGuides mention aegis-web, nexora-web, and MetaData-Extraction/.Local folder is MetaData/; Compose service and container are both agis-web.
PDF field labelCommands and example output alternate between Comment and Comments.The custom config defines Comments. Inspect broad output with real tag names before relying on one friendly label.
GPS implications“Exactly where photos were taken,” “classified facility,” and “flight altitude.”Metadata is intentionally assigned to stock photos. Areas are documentation interpretations; altitude is above sea level per its reference tag.
Drone speedThe unused generator draws an 8.2 m/s HUD overlay.The current metadata assignment uses an 8.2 value with a km/h reference; the generator is not the build path.
Universal sanitizationexiftool -all= is offered for both JPEG and PDF as a complete cleanup.ExifTool warns PDF edits are incremental and reversible. Secure PDF cleanup needs a verified rewrite/regeneration and broader content review.
Directory-listing mappingArchitecture uses the old CWE-538 name for /downloads/ autoindex.CWE-538 describes sensitive information in public files; CWE-548 specifically describes directory listing.
Isolation guaranteesArchitecture says “no outbound connections,” “read-only,” and “no host access.”Compose does not enforce egress blocking or a read-only root filesystem; 8080:80 does not restrict binding to loopback. Containerization is not proof of absolute isolation. No deployment was performed.

Where to look in the current source

  • Dockerfile lines 19–21: build argument and default flag fallback.
  • Lines 33–49: copied generator/config, stock-image inputs, and public filename mapping.
  • Lines 51–65: PDF metadata assignment, including the custom flag field.
  • Lines 67–91: exterior-image metadata and maintenance note.
  • Lines 93–119: drone metadata, serial, survey schedule, GPS, and speed reference.
  • Lines 121–145: operations-center metadata and credential-like note.
  • Lines 147–155: metadata-printing commands that would run during a build; not captured evidence here.
  • Lines 161–193: runtime image, website/artifact copies, Nginx config, exposed port, and server command.
Read the Compose configuration · inert snapshot
docker-compose.yml · operative configuration, comments omitted
services:
  agis-web:
    build:
      context: .
      dockerfile: Dockerfile
      args:
        FLAG: "FLAG{classified_document_metadata_exposed}"
    container_name: agis-web
    ports:
      - "8080:80"
    restart: unless-stopped

No startup command is invoked by this reference. If an authorized instructor later deploys it, they should decide on explicit loopback binding, egress restrictions, and other appropriate isolation controls rather than assuming this file already enforces them.

External references consulted

The explanations above incorporate these official sources. Their links are optional; the essential content is summarized here and works offline. No external fonts, images, maps, or scripts are loaded by this HTML.

Review boundaries

  • Established from source: public filenames, current build path, configured metadata strings, default flag, Compose service/port, and Nginx serving rules.
  • Derived here: signed decimal coordinates and distinctions between intended assignments, document claims, and evidence.
  • Not established: successful build, generated PDF page count, final ExifTool output, inherited source-image metadata, live download behavior, map positions, or credential validity.
  • Not performed: executing any supplied file, Python/Perl script, Docker/Compose operation, metadata command, browser preview, target scan, map lookup, or credential test.
  • Not embedded: original PDFs, source JPEGs, generated download artifacts, or runnable lab code. Only selected source excerpts are included as escaped text.
One HTML file, no dependencies or automatic network requests. Copy buttons copy text only; page switching, dark mode, and printing are local browser features. Reading the guide never launches the lab.