Exposed Metadata
Source-backed referenceA public PDF and three photographs tell two stories: the one visible on the page, and the private details left inside the files. The vulnerability is publishing both without a metadata review.
- 1. Authoring inputs
PDF + source JPEGsOrdinary marketing content and stock photographs. - 2. Embedded details
Comments / EXIF / GPSThe build adds a flag, usernames, coordinates, and internal notes. - 3. Public release
/downloads/Nginx serves the complete files with no sanitization or authentication. - 4. Local inspection
Read metadata, correlateA recipient can discover information not shown in the normal preview.
The scenario
Aegis Defense Systems is a fictional defense contractor in this training lab. Its website advertises a capabilities brief, a facility exterior photograph, a drone survey, and an operations-center photograph as public resources.
The PDF carries a flag in a custom metadata field. The photographs carry identities, equipment details, timestamps, GPS coordinates, and freeform operational notes. The operations-center comment even labels a Wi-Fi value and names an internal VPN endpoint and badge number.
In a real assessment, the point is not simply finding a flag. It is demonstrating exactly which unintended details crossed the public-release boundary, where they came from, and what a publisher must change to prevent recurrence.
What was reviewed—and what was not run
The local Dockerfile, Compose file, Nginx configuration, website source, metadata configuration, Python generators, three Markdown guides, and already-extracted six-page PDF text were read. No supplied file or script was executed. No Docker build, container, server, metadata-extraction command, browser preview, or live-target request was run. Values below are source-defined, not a captured download transcript.
What a complete solve means
- Identify all four public download paths and their file types.
- Explain the difference between visible content and embedded metadata.
- Locate the PDF's custom
Commentsfield and the source-defined flag. - Interpret the JPEG fields, including GPS hemisphere references and complete
UserCommentvalues. - Compile an evidence-backed finding without treating editable metadata as proof of a real location, person, or working credential.
- Recommend a file-type-aware release process, not just hiding a download link.
The central idea
Permission to view a document is not necessarily permission to receive every hidden field inside it.
The important correction
The current Dockerfile configures one flag in the PDF. Older image-flag claims do not match its drone comment.
Reveal the source-defined default flag
The Dockerfile fallback and Compose build argument agree on this value. A different build argument can change it; no generated challenge PDF was inspected here.
FLAG{classified_document_metadata_exposed}The supplied six-page write-up also lists this as its single flag. The supposed drone flag mentioned in other documentation is not injected by the current Dockerfile.